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Abstract This paper proposes a 2-block 3-region economic geography model that can
account for the most salient stylized facts experienced by Eastern European transition
economies during the period 1990–2005. In contrast to the existing literature, which
has favored technological explanations, trade liberalization is the only driving force.
The model correctly predicts that in the first half of the period, trade liberalization
led to divergence in GDP per capita, both between the West and the East and within
the East. Consistent with the data, in the second half of the period, this process was
reversed and convergence became the dominant force.
JEL Classification F12 · F15 · P2
1 Introduction
From the beginning of the 1990s to 2005, the Eastern European economic transition
has been characterized by a U-shaped pattern of relative development (see Fig. 1).
Initially, relative income per capita between Eastern and Western Europe diverged,
but roughly from 1999 onwards, this pattern was reversed and Eastern Europe started
to catch up with its Western counterpart. Moreover, when analyzing the performance
inside Eastern Europe, a similar pattern emerges. The countries closer to the West
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Fig. 1 East/West and Hinterland/Border GDP per capita ratios
Fig. 2 East/West industrial output ratio
(Border) initially experienced faster growth than those situated further from the West
(Hinterland), but from the end of the 1990s, this was also reversed.
A similar pattern can be observed when the attention is focused on industrial output.
Hinterland (East) initially suffered a continuous relative deindustrialization, followed
by a remarkable recovery from the beginning of the new century (see Figs. 2 and 3).
Thus, the stylized facts exhibit both an East-West and a Border-Hinterland U-shaped
pattern in terms of (real) GDP per capita and industrial output.
The literature has typically explained these U-shaped patterns by relying on tech-
nological arguments or on the misallocation of factors of production. Boldrin and
Canova (2003), for example, suggest that the technological obsolescence led to an
initial period of intense unemployment and reallocations after trade was liberalized.
Blanchard (1996) and Blanchard and Kremer (1997) link the initial slump to microeco-
nomic “disorganization”: the collapse of the state sector was precipitated by traditional
input suppliers, who found attractive opportunities outside the state sector and broke
the established productive chains. Cociuba (2006) and Keller (1997) also stress the
role played by technology adoption to account for the GDP trajectories of Eastern
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Fig. 3 Hinterland/Border industrial output ratio
European countries. The existing literature thus puts the emphasis on the intensity
of reallocations that were needed to adapt to a superior Western technology, fol-
lowed by a remarkable catch-up process that was conditioned by redistributive public
policies.
While we do not claim these explanations are erroneous in any way, in this paper,
we deliberately disregard issues of technological backwardness or sectorial misalloca-
tions. Instead, we propose an economic geography model where trade liberalization is
the only driving force. This is based on our belief that the trade reorientation toward the
West and the initial deterioration of the market for exports were crucial initial condi-
tions for the transition (see, among others, Campos and Coricelli 2002; Christoffersen
and Doyle 1998; De Melo et al. 2001 or Tondl and Vuksic 2003). Our focus is on the
evolution of the Eastern European economies right after the collapse of the social-
ist experiment. Besides, we hope the insights derived from our experiment could be
relevant to analyze other trade liberalization processes in different countries. Since it
can be argued that, prior to the transition period, all Central and Eastern European
countries shared similar technological and institutional conditions; we claim that the
disparate evolutions of Border and Hinterland may have something to do with the
relative proximity to the EU market. That is the reason why we emphasize the causal
determinants related to geography and trade openness.
We develop a model with 2 blocks (West and East) and three regions (one region
in the West, and a Border and Hinterland in the East). As is usually the case in
the Economic Geography literature, our model assumes that agriculture is perfectly
competitive, industry is monopolistically competitive and workers are perfectly mobile
between sectors. Trade in industrial goods is subject to transport costs, which are
higher between Hinterland and West than between Border and West. As in Krugman
and Venables (1995) and Puga (1999), industrial firms use intermediate goods, which
gives rise to forward and backward linkages. The relative size of the endowments of
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labor and land in our model match the actual shares in our three regions. For simplicity
and to make our results as sharp as possible, we assume that West and East exhibit
identical technologies.
This simple setup, which abstracts from technological differences, is sufficient
to account for the main stylized facts. The focus of our analysis is the pattern of
convergence in terms of GDP and industrialization (between East and West; Hinterland
and Border) produced by the trade liberalization during the transition period. Our
model can be viewed as a generalization of Krugman and Venables (1995) and Puga
(1999). They showed how in a two-block model the earlier stages of trade liberalization
could bring about lower real wages and deindustrialization in disfavored markets.
Our paper differentiates from Puga (1999) in that we allow for internal trade costs
within the East, making the setup non-equidistant. In that way, Border and Hinterland
become asymmetric in terms of their distance to the West. For that reason, we must rely
on numerical simulations. This modification is not substantial from a purely theoretical
point of view and so our paper should be considered only an empirical application of
Puga (1999), with a slight structural modification. A similar exercise was undertaken
by Bosker et al. (2010), with the qualification that they did not focus on the historical
experience of transition, but they tried to shed light on the future impact (and only
within the West) of the recent EU enlargement. Our paper is a contribution to this
literature.
Our simulation results explain very well the actual relative evolution of the different
regions described above. First, during the time following the trade liberalization, these
results are as follows. Trade liberalization should initially lead to divergence in GDP
per capita, both between West and East and between Border and Hinterland. The
good performance of the West can be explained by a Home Market effect. As trade
costs drop, the relative profitability varies in favor of the largest market. This same
phenomenon leads to the relative initial deindustrialization of the East in favor of the
West. Furthermore, the results show that there should be an initial divergence between
Border and Hinterland in favor of the former location. This is the case because the
proximity to the West involves a crucial access to the bulk of consumption goods and
intermediate inputs.
Second, the results show that during the final stages of East-West trade liberal-
ization, a convergence in GDP per capita should appear, both between Border and
Hinterland and between East and West. On the one hand, this is the case because when
international trade costs are sufficiently low, proximity to large markets is no longer
a basic determinant of firms’ location. On the other hand, the previous agglomeration
in the West led to (relatively) lower wages in the Border and even more so in the
Hinterland. This is now crucial for the recovery of a substantial manufacturing basis
by the Border and to a larger extent by the Hinterland.
We also present a series of industry-level stylized facts to give additional support
to our hypothesis that NEG forces were at work during the aforementioned regional
convergence pattern. When we break down our output data by industry, we observe,
as trade freeness increases, that sectors with significant scale economies and/or high
value-to-weight ratios follow an inverted U-shape pattern in their geographical output
concentration. The spatial concentration patterns of these sectors are strongly affected
by economic geography forces, i.e., increasing returns to scale and transport costs.
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In contrast, sectors where scale economies are less relevant and value-to-weight ratios
are lower follow a monotonic concentration pattern. The latter is more consistent with
theories of comparative advantage. We argue that these stylized facts seem to be more
consistent with a NEG approach and less so with the conventional technological-
obsolescence plus catch-up approach.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 mentions some additional related
literature. Section 3 defines the three regions and further describes the main policy
changes, justifying the adoption of the assumptions underlying our policy experiment.
Section 4 briefly describes the stylized facts we aim to reproduce. Our modeling
framework is introduced in Sect. 5, though it will be more extensively presented in the
“Appendix”; we also discuss in Sect. 5 our numerical experiments studying the effects
of trade liberalization. Section 6 shows some microeconomic stylized facts. Section 7
concludes.
2 Other related literature
In addition to the papers cited in the introduction, the following literature is worth
mentioning. Some other papers have already developed more-than-two-region models
of economic geography, either using the Dixit and Stiglitz’s modeling framework
(Krugman and Livas-Elizondo 1996; Alonso-Villar 1999; Monfort and Nicolini 2000;
Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran 2004 etc.) or using the Otaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse’s one
(Behrens et al. 2006). Ago et al. (2006) uses both methods and compares them in the
context of a three-region model.
Another important paper is Venables (2000), who uses a three-location framework
as well, but focuses on the internal geography of a developing country that is hardly
industrialized for intermediate levels of trade costs. Venables’ insights are probably
more applicable to countries like China and India, which—given their lower initial
level of development—could not possibly experience divergence with respect to the
West during their transition process. Our starting point is different because for all
levels of trade costs, both West and East are significantly industrialized.
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, only Forslid et al. (2002), Brulhart et al.
(2004), Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004) and Iranzo and Peri (2009) were directly
motivated by the experience of transition economies. Both Brulhart et al. (2004) and
Forslid et al. (2002) present scenarios for the future economic geography of Europe, but
without a retrospective approximation to the 1990s. In particular, Brulhart et al. (2004)
pay attention to the internal geography of the West as a result of the EU enlargement.
In contrast to their paper, our priority is to explore the patterns of industrial relocation
within the East, together with their implications for relative (real) GDP per capita,
during the period 1990–2005.
In the case of Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004), the authors also focus on
the connections between external trade and internal geography, showing that both
the concentration and the dispersion of industry are theoretically possible for Eastern
Europe. These authors link the mass of manufacturing varieties to the (fixed) national
stock of mobile labor (as in Krugman 1991). For this reason, they do not study the
processes of industrialization/deindustrialization at the national level or reproduce our
non-monotonic patterns of convergence.
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Finally, Iranzo and Peri (2009) examine the welfare consequences of the liberaliza-
tion of both trade and East-West migration, with the first reform predating the second.
For them, trade liberalization is a one-shot event instead of a gradual process. This
implies that the non-monotonic patterns of convergence generated by trade openness
cannot be captured by their model. Our model tries to fill this gap.
3 Introducing the scenario under analysis
3.1 Definition of the three regions
The different U-shapes mentioned in the introduction are robust to different criteria in
the selection of Border and Hinterland countries. For instance, we could place in the
Border those countries sharing boundaries with an EU-15 thriving economy. Alterna-
tively, we could just call Border to the set of countries that joined (or will join soon,
like Croatia) the European Union.1 Therefore, and without big loss of generality, we
decided to choose the latter convention and specify our regions as follows: West (EU-
15), Border (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and Hinterland (Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, Moldova,
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).2
Our choice of the national and supra-national (instead of the sub-national) levels as
the relevant spatial dimensions to characterize our stylized facts has been deliberate. In
that respect, we are consistent with the empirical literature, which emphasizes how in
Eastern Europe country-specific factors are more important determinants of regional
income differences than localized conditions (see Brulhart and Koenig-Soubeyran
2006; Melchior 2008 or Bosker 2009).
3.2 Policy changes
3.2.1 West-Border trade liberalization
The route toward East-West trade liberalization started quite early in some Eastern
European countries like the former Yugoslavia and Romania. In particular, the Euro-
pean Community signed an initial Generalized System of Preferences with Romania
in 1974, and an agreement on manufacturing trade was reached in 1980. Nevertheless,
the most comprehensive Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP) were approved
by the EU and individual Eastern countries at the beginning of the 1990s. The EU
granted GSP status first to Hungary and Poland (1990), then to Bulgaria and former
Czechoslovakia (1991), and subsequently to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (1992).
All these reforms culminated with the accession of all the Border countries to the
European Union (Croatia is expected to do it very soon).
1 The simulations run under this alternative specification are available upon request.
2 Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia are not considered because not all data were available since 1990.
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Fig. 4 Border-West Industrial Trade freeness (calculated as a yearly median for all the possible/available
country pairwise and 38 ISIC Rev. 2 at the combined 3-digit industry classification level)
Fig. 5 Aggregated Trade freeness
In Fig. 4, we display the evolution of the three region-pairwise macroeconomic
trade freeness (using data from IMF Bilateral Trade Statistics). Moreover, in Fig. 5,
we also display the West-Border evolution of the medians of the trade freeness across
industrial sectors (using data from Nicita and Olarreaga 2007). The concept of trade
freeness, used by Head and Mayer (2004), is an inverse measure of the magnitude of
the trade costs between two particular locations. It is computed in the following way:
∅i j =
(
mi j m ji
mii m j j
)1/2
where ∅i j denotes the trade freeness between locations i and j ; mi j stands for country
i’s imports of country j’s manufacturing goods; and mii represents country i’s ship-
ments to itself, computed as the difference between the value of the gross output in
the producing country minus the aggregate value of its exports.
Figures 4 and 5 show how remarkable was the rise of the aggregate and industry-
level West-Border’s trade freeness during the period under consideration. On the con-
trary, the aggregate trade freeness remained quite stable between West-Hinterland and
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Border-Hinterland. Unfortunately, the inexistence of industry-level data on gross out-
put and bilateral trade for the Border and Hinterland countries prevented us from cal-
culating the evolution of the industry-level West-Hinterland and Border-Hinterland’s
trade freeness.
3.2.2 Limited migration
According to Kaczmarczyk and Okolski (2005), during the communist era, migration
in Eastern Europe was negligible, both within and between countries. Rural-to-urban
mobility was also greatly delayed and generally low. Moreover, in contrast to Western
European nations, in many Eastern countries, the process of industrialization took
place in the absence of massive urbanization.
It was during the 1990s that substantial policy reforms were enacted to liberal-
ize labor flows across Eastern European countries. For example, in 1993, the Czech
Republic established a liberal migration policy which turned the country into the home
to tens of thousands of migrants from Europe and Asia (Drbohlav 2005). In 1993, Rus-
sia abolished the internal passport and allowed for freedom of movement (Heleniak
2002). This also resulted in many migrants coming from other Hinterland countries.
However, the magnitude of the Hinterland-Border permanent migratory movements
was relatively insignificant. According to Mansoor and Quillin (2006), “there are
minimal flows from the CIS [Hinterland] states into the [Border]”, which amount
approximately to 5 % of the CIS countries total emigration flow. Such flow from the
Hinterland to the Border could be quantified for the year 2003 in about 300 thousand
people, out of 6 million people who permanently emigrated from their Hinterland
country in that particular year.
The migration from Border to Western European counties between 1990 and 2000
faced the existence of many restrictions, and the migration Hinterland to West was
inexistent. In this context, a notable exception was the migration of Eastern European
ethnic Germans toward their homeland. Hence, the stock of Border’s immigrants in
the Western Europe only rose from 758,193 to 965,724 in the period 1990–2000 (see
Pytlikova 2006). However, from the turn of the century, the Border-West migration
gained significance. According to Boeri and Brücker (2005), the stock of immigrants
increased in 1.1 million between 1990 and 2005. Thus, in the five-year period 2000–
2005, the stock of immigrants has roughly increased 4.3 times more than it did in the
previous decade, though the 1.1 million represents only 1 % of Border’s population in
1990.
4 Main stylized facts
The three stylized facts we aim to account for in our theoretical model are as follows:
4.1 U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita between East and West
In Fig. 1, we see that the relative income per capita between East and West diverges
until 1999 and starts to converge thereafter.
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Fig. 6 Border and Hinterland shares of the European industrial output
4.2 U-shaped pattern of relative income per capita within East (Hinterland relative to
Border)
This can be seen in Fig. 1, where the turning point is again around 1999.
4.3 U-shaped pattern of industrialization between East and West and between
Hinterland and Border
Figure 6 shows the industrial output’s share of both Border and Hinterland as a fraction
of the aggregate European industrial output. It is apparent that the Border keeps a
roughly stable share, whereas the Hinterland’s share initially decays sharply but firmly
recovers later. We recognize that it is a frequent suspicion that the industrial and GDP
revival of the Hinterland may be linked to the “petro-boom” experienced by resource-
rich countries like Russia. However, we show in Figs. 7 and 8 that the U-shaped
patterns are robust to the exclusion of the Russian Federation from the Hinterland.
5 The model
5.1 Overview
In order to make the reading easier and given that our model is an application of
Puga (1999), we have decided to move its lengthy mathematical description to the
“Appendix”. This model considers a framework with two blocks (West and East)
and three regions: West (W ), and Border (B) and Hinterland (H) in East. There are
two sectors, agriculture and industry; two factors of production, labor and land; and
both blocks have identical technologies. East is a larger block in terms of land area
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Fig. 7 East/West and Hinterland/Border Real GDP per capita, excluding Russia
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.055
Hinterland's industrial share Border's industrial share
Fig. 8 Border and Hinterland shares of the European industrial output, excluding Russia
and population, though the Western market is better integrated due to the absence of
internal trade costs.
Each region i endowment’s shares Li and Ki (for population and land area, respec-
tively) of the three regions’ aggregate are detailed as follows: the shares for the year
1990 are used, Li90 and Ki90,3 except for labor in West and Border, which are allowed
to change according to the migration flows. For the latter case, it is assumed that indi-
viduals get a disutility from emigration, and hence, they do not emigrate unless such
disutility is offset by real-wage differentials (see the “Appendix” for more details).
Trade in industrial goods is subject to different transport costs for each region pair-
wise (details in the next section). The agricultural good is produced under perfect
3 These shares are obtained from the World Development Indicators and remained very stable along the
entire time period.
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competition, using land and labor as inputs. Since the supply of land is fixed, the agri-
cultural sector faces decreasing returns to labor. This entails that agriculture endoge-
nously takes place in all locations. The monopolistically competitive industrial sector
uses labor and intermediate goods, giving rise to forward and backward linkages. Our
model is very much similar to Puga (1999), though it exhibits two basic differences.
That is, the introduction of transport costs between Border and Hinterland, which pre-
vents the full convergence of Eastern and Western welfare levels, even under perfect
trade openness between East and West. The second difference is the introduction of
migration disutility.
5.2 Numerical simulations
5.2.1 Parameterization
The goal of this section is to carry out an experiment that looks at the effect that
a gradual decrease in mainly West-Border trade costs (due to trade and migration
liberalization) has on GDP per capita and industrial convergence.
The values for our model’s parameters are mainly taken from Bosker et al. (2010),
who empirically estimated the parameters in Puga (1999)’s model. These authors used
a sample of 194 EU-15 NUTS-II regions over the period 1992–2000 and then applied
such estimation to simulate the impact (on the West) of the ongoing integration with
the Border countries. As it was stated earlier, our aim is to replicate the stylized facts
(1), (2) and (3) by focusing on the pure effects of geography and trade liberalization
without resorting to taste or technological differences between the East and the West.
Therefore, the structural parameter estimates, described in the “Appendix”, are as
follows:
σ Elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties 7.122
γ Share of consumers’ income spent on manufactures 0.7a
μ Share of firms’ revenue spent on intermediates 0.284
∅ Labor elasticity in the agricultural production function 0.234
a Bosker et al. (2010) uses γ = 0.994, which reflects the share of income spent on anything but agricultural
products for the EU-15. At the same time, they consider the possibility of using γ = 0.335, which is the
share of industrial goods on aggregate consumption. We have considered more appropriate to report results
for a γ in between these two values, but our results are robust to a value of γ = 0.994
Trade in industrial goods is subject to transport costs, represented by the parameters
∅W−B,∅B−H and ∅W−H with ∅W−H = ∅W−B × ∅B−H and where ∅ = 0 (∅ = 1)
can be translated as to an infinite (zero) trade cost. For our simulations, we assume
that ∅B−H remains constant throughout the whole period at 0.01 while ∅W−B linearly
increases from 0 to 1.
In our simulations, we do not intend to capture the whole set of stable (and unstable)
equilibria at any level of the trade costs. We just obtain an initial West-East autarky
equilibrium, ∅W−B = ∅W−H = 0, and then, as the trade costs fall, we increase
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Fig. 9 Simulated real wages—East relative to West and Hinterland relative to Border
Fig. 10 Simulated industrial output ratios—East relative to West and Hinterland relative to Border
(decrease) the local mass of manufacturing varieties in those locations where profits
are positive (negative) until the zero-profit condition is satisfied. Thus, a sequence of
equilibria is obtained.
5.2.2 Trade liberalization
The results for our scenario can be seen in Figs. 9 and 10, where the horizontal
axis shows the (increasing) degree of West-Border trade freeness. Initially, Eastern
and Western markets are completely isolated from each other. As ∅W−B and at a
lesser extend ∅W−H start to rise, there is the appearance of tougher competition for
both Eastern locations (especially for the Border), whereas the Western market is
hardly affected by the scant competitors in the Border and the more distant firms
in the Hinterland. This leads to a process of East–West divergence. Nevertheless,
openness to the Western market implies not only tougher competition, but also higher
exports and cheaper imports of intermediates in the East, especially in the Border. The
proximity to a large market is crucial for the Border to absorb a portion of Hinterland’s
manufacturing share, leading to a process of within-East divergence.
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Fig. 11 Simulated real wages—East relative to West and Hinterland relative to Border (excluding Russia)
Fig. 12 Simulated industrial output ratios—East relative to West and Hinterland relative to Border (exclud-
ing Russia)
Once trade openness between our three locations starts to be sufficiently high,
being closer to large markets—with abundant purchasing power—ceases to be the
firms’ main priority. Simultaneously, the previous Eastern deindustrialization creates
a reservoir of cheap labor in the primary sector of the East, especially in the Hinterland,
whereas the Western labor costs have been growing higher and higher.
Lower nominal wages in the East, together with the possibility to import Western
intermediates more cheaply, end up precipitating the consecutive reindustrialization
of both Eastern locations: starting with the Border and followed by Hinterland, once
the wages in the former surge. Remoteness was Hinterland’s initial disadvantage but
once relative wages become lower there and land rents more abundant, industrial
profitability returns. As a robustness check, in Figs. 11 and 12, we show the simulation
results with Russia excluded, which show no significant difference to the previous ones.
6 Microeconomic evidence at the industry level
This section brings industry-level evidence to give additional support to our hypothesis
that NEG forces were at work during the aforementioned regional convergence pattern.
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Fig. 13 Simulated values of the population in the West when Russia is included in the Hinterland. Curves
are drawn with the calibrated value of ε, with one half of such value and 50 % above such value
The argument is that the industries exhibiting higher scale economies and/or value-
to-weight ratios are more susceptible of facing a spatial concentration of their output,
hence more affected by the centripetal and centrifugal forces characteristic of the
NEG. Therefore and as suggested by Forslid et al. (2002), for intermediate values of
the sectorial trade freeness and if such forces were the predominant ones, these sectors
should tend to concentrate in the larger market.
Our task faced the challenge put by the large scarcity of data for both industry-level
output and bilateral trade for Border and their practically inexistence for Hinterland.
However, we have managed to single out a few country-pairwise industry-level output-
concentration ratios for a selection of relevant West-Border pair of countries and graph
them against the industry-level values of trade freeness.
Figure 14 shows that sectors with important scale economies and/or high value-to-
weight’s ratios (first three columns) display an inverted U-shaped pattern (or something
close to it) of their output concentration in the West as the trade freeness increases. In
contrast, sectors where scale economies are less relevant and value-to-weight ratios
are lower (last three columns) follow a monotonic concentration pattern. The latter is
more consistent with theories of comparative advantage. Our judgments were based
on the sectorial scale economies’ ranking taken from Pratten (1988) as well as the
value-to-weight ratio from the US–Canada Trade Statistics—North American Trans-
border Freight data (NATBF). In particular, the first three columns in Fig. 14 collect
sectors that are either within the first 10 in Pratten’s scale economy ranking and/or
within the first 20 in terms of the value-to-weight ratio. The sectors grouped in the last
three columns do not satisfy any of the two previous requirements.
The mentioned stylized facts seem to be exclusive to the NEG approach and less
so to the conventional technological-obsolescence approach. The latter could explain
a macroeconomic U-shape pattern and could even possibly predict the existence of a
U-shape (monotonic) pattern in relative more (less) obsolete sectors. However, it would
not predict the above stylized facts, except in the case that the sectors with higher
economies of scale and/or higher value-to-weight ratios were also the ones which have
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suffered a higher technological obsolescence. However, it seems difficult to think that,
for instance, Leather and Pottery China have suffered a high obsolescence. Similarly,
the ex-communist countries were quite advanced in the production of Non-Ferrous
Metals and even Chemicals and so they do not seem to represent their relatively more
obsolete sectors.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined some mechanisms—exclusively related to economic
geography and trade openness—as possible ingredients to account for the relative
income profile (and industrialization) of transition countries along the period 1990–
2005. We have deliberately disregarded any consideration of technological differences
or unrelated public-policy factors, and hence, our explanations can be considered as
complementary to those presented in the literature.
Initially, higher trade openness generates a deterioration of the industrial capacity
in the East in favor of the West, due to the higher integration of the market in the
latter location. Something similar happens between Hinterland and Border, where
foreign inputs are much cheaper. As a result, the early stages of trade liberalization
are characterized by both East-West and Border-Hinterland divergence. Later, lower
marginal costs channel a recovered manufacturing profitability toward the East, first
to the Border and later to the Hinterland, which finally gets reindustrialized under our
parameterization. This fact also drives the revival of the East relative to the West.
8 Appendix
Our model is a slight extension of Puga (1999)’s model. Ki and Li are the stocks
of land and labor in each block i , normalized as shares of the total stocks in the
blocks. Moreover, the labor shares of Border and West are adjusted by the evolution
of migration.
8.1 Demand
There is a food sector (F), the numeraire and an industrial sector. Consumers have
Cobb-Douglas preferences over the primary good and a CES composite of manufac-
turing varieties (or varieties for short) with industrial expenditure share, 0 < γ < 1.
Maximizing the CES sub-utility function subject to the income constraint yields the
consumer demand for each variety h (8.1), where Y is the consumer’s income, q is the
manufactures’ price index, and σ and p(h) are the varieties’ elasticity of substitution
and c.i.f. price, respectively.
c(h) = p(h)−σ qσ−1γ Y ; q =
⎛
⎝
n∫
0
p(h)1−σ dh
⎞
⎠
1/(1−σ)
(8.1)
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Firms also use varieties as intermediates for which also have an elasticity of sub-
stitution σ . The local demand for a variety depends on the spending by both global
consumers and local firms. The aggregate spending from location i on any variety is
ei = γ Yi + μni pi xi , where ni (xi ) is the mass of produced varieties (the equilibrium
output of any variety) in region i . The first term is the share of aggregate consumers’
income spent on manufactures, and the second is the expenditure on intermediates.
8.2 Manufacturing supply
The manufacturing sector is monopolistically competitive. The production input in
manufacturing is a Cobb-Douglas composite of labor (with a wage rate of wi ) and
intermediates. Total cost in region i is as follows:
C (xi ) =
(
qμi w
1−μ
i
)
(α + βxi ) (8.2)
where α and β are the fixed-cost and marginal-input requirements for each variety.
Profit maximization results in a constant mark-up over marginal costs, as shown in
(8.3):4
pi =
(
qμi w
1−μ
i
)
(8.3)
Finally, using the zero-profit condition and the mark-up pricing rule (8.3), we get
that the break-even supply of any variety is xi = 1.
8.3 Supply of food
Consumers’ income comes from two sources, local workers’ wages and/or agricultural
rents. Agriculture produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale,
perfect competition and no transport cost across locations. Its production in region i
depends on the available local land (Ki ) and labor (L F,i ) such that
F = F (L F,i ) = (L F,i )θ K 1−θi (8.4)
By applying rent maximization, the aggregate agricultural rents in location i are
Ri = (1 − θ) Ki
(
θ
wi
) θ
1−θ
, which added to the labor income gives region’s i aggregate
nominal income
Yi = wi Li + Ri (8.5)
4 We have applied the normalizations α = 1σ and β = σ−1σ .
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8.4 Equilibrium with transport costs
As a result of (8.1) and the conditions of the demand for manufacturing varieties, the
total demand faced by a firm h located in region i is
xi (h) =
∑
j{B,H,W }
(pi (h))−σ e j qσ−1j T
1−σ
i j (8.6)
where Ti j is the trade cost from region i to j , and e j is the aggregate level of expenditure
on manufactures in region j . Then, from expressions (8.2), (8.3) and the normalizations
in footnote (4), the profits of any manufacturing firm in region i are
πi = pi
σ
(xi − 1) (8.7)
The labor-market-clearing condition for any region i results in the local labor supply
being (from (8.2) and the profit-maximization conditions in the agricultural sector)
Li = (1 − μ) C (xi (h))
wi
ni + Ki
(
θ
wi
) 1
1−θ
(8.8)
where the first (second) term of (8.8) is the manufacturing (agricultural) labor demand.
8.5 Labor mobility
Labor migration (and re-migration) takes place only between Border and West. Indi-
viduals have an idiosyncratic home-biased preference, represented by a parameter θ ,
which implies they get a disutility from emigration. They do not emigrate unless such
disutility is offset by real-wage differentials. For instance, a Border’s inhabitant would
migrate to the West if and only if wWqγW
> θ wBqγB
, where wiqγi
is region’s i real wage. As
in Faini (1996), θ is distributed (across a region’s population) according to a Pareto
density function, f (θ) = ε
θε+1 with θ ∈ (1,∞) and . Thus, the fraction of the original
population from the Border that does not migrate is

B =
∞∫
wW
qγW
wB
qγB
f (θ) dθ = min
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
⎡
⎣
wB
qγB
wW
qγW
⎤
⎦
W
, 1
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ (8.9)
and so the percentage of the Border’s population that migrates, 1 − 
B , increases
with the wage differential. ε can be considered as an indicator of the degree of labor
mobility.
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Similarly, since we allow in principle for labor mobility in both directions, the
fraction of the original population from the West that remains there is

W =
∞∫
wB
qγB
wW
qγW
f (θ) dθ = min
⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣
wW
qγW
wB
qγB
⎤
⎦

, 1
⎫⎬
⎭ (8.9′)
We have incorporated migration flows to our simulations, after calibrating one
parameter (ε) measuring how big is the propensity to migrate of the population from
the Border and the West. Such calibration has followed Faini (1996)’s functional form.
People from the Border and the West will only start migrating when the relative
wage of their homeland is the lower of the two. Therefore, our chosen equations
describing labor mobility are as follows:
Lw = 0.48
W + 0.14 (1 − 
B) ; L B = 0.62 − Lw (8.10)
where 0.48 and 0.14 are the population shares of the West and the Border, respectively,
in 1990. As commented in Sect. 3.2., Border-West migration only started in earnest by
the turn of the century. Therefore, our simulations reflect the possibility of migration
for values of Border-West trade freeness equal or higher than ∅W−B = 0.04. Our
qualitative results are robust to the introduction of very different choices for that
delay.
Given that 1 % of the Border population migrated to EU15 between 1990 and 2005,
and prior to 1990, we can assume that Border-West migration was not allowed, and in
our model, these facts imply that
0.01 = 1 − 
2005
Let us denote by r to the ratio of Border-West GDP per capita in 2005. Then,
ε = ln(0.99)
ln(r)
≈ 0.00672.
The simulated pattern of migration and remigration is described in Fig. 13, for
the case in which Russia is not omitted from the Hinterland.5 There we can observe
how the West absorbs initially a small share of the Border population, which will be
gradually re-migrating later toward the homeland. As shown in Fig. 13, our simulated
(qualitative) results in terms of the patterns of development are robust to any reasonable
variation in the value of ε.
5 The graph for the case in which Russia is omitted is basically isomorphic, though the initial population
shares in 1990 are different. That figure is also available upon request.
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